financial history review
There is also a continuing debate over whether universal banks could have avoided and/or minimised the effects of the 1930s crisis had their managements been more careful regarding lending to domestic industry. It is generally recognised that ties between industry and banking initially contributed to industrial strength but, over time, led to a wave of crashes that characterised interwar banking. However, some authors have blamed the banks' substantial industrial indebtedness for the 1930s crisis while praising British and French banks' more 'conservative' practices.4 Others have rejected this criticism, asking for a careful scrutiny of the economic realities of the 1920s, and concluding that the 1930s crisis would have occurred even if such banks had previously acted with 'exemplary caution '.5 This article examines the interwar development of multinational investment undertaken by the most prominent Italian universal bank -Banca Commerciale Italiana [hereafter BCI] -in Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Romania, countries referred to here as east central Europe. It analyses the extent to which considerations concerning universal banking's development are valid in the case of Italian multinational investment in east central Europe. It is neither a study of the 1930s financial crisis nor an analysis of the Italian universal banking per se. The article recognises that BCI, like its Austrian and German counterparts, was exposed to comparable contextual developments, but questions the implicit relationship between the fate of its east central European commitments and the universal banking system's general problems during the early 1930s. Evidence suggests that BCI's withdrawal from this region, beginning in the late 1920s, was more a result of managerial shortcomings and unsound investment decisions and not because of the crisis.
The discussion is divided into four sections, followed by a conclusion. The first provides a brief rehearsal of the concept of, and historical debates over, universal banking, and offers an analytical framework for the analysis of BCI's multinational investment in east central Europe. Section II comprises a summary history of BCI emphasising its independent policy during most of the interwar period. Section III focuses on BCI's multinational investment and underlines the importance of east central European assets within the context of the bank's overall foreign direct investment [hereafter FDI]. Aspects regarding BCI's entry modes in the region are also analysed in detail. The fourth section considers the growth of BCI's multinational investment in east central European industry and banking, highlighting features of its regional investment strategy. BCI emerges as a highly independent institution led by an authoritarian banker whose industrial vision and ethnic-biased investment decisions proved to be very costly even before the 1930s crisis. The conclusions reinforce the idea that the difficulties of the 1930s represented a back-ground to, rather than the main cause of, the collapse of BCI's most important investments in east central Europe. A more satisfactory explanation points towards the need for appropriate managerial skills to maintain foreign assets, together with the efficient allocation of the banks' financial resources when investing abroad.
I
Universal banks are institutions well known for their particular links with industry. They provide a complete range of commercial and investment services to their industrial clients and such services involve stable, long-lasting relationships. Many have tried to explain their economic rationale. Hilferding coined the term 'finance capital', or capital applied to industry, and considered that this assisted capitalist development within continental Europe. He viewed the banking-industry relationship from the creditor-debtor point of view and proclaimed the banks' supremacy over industry.6 Subsequently, Gerschenkron applied the concept of 'finance capital' to a model of economic backwardness, drawn from Russian experience, concluding that universal banks and/or governments acted as substitutes (depending on a country's degree of backwardness), for the lack of capital and entrepreneurship which was the driving force within developed nations. According to him, universal banks performed a kind of 'missionary' task for industry.7
In fact, universal banking appears as more of a consequence than a cause of European industrial development from the 1850s. Recent research challenges generalisations regarding banks' 'supremacy' over industry and/or their allegedly 'missionary task'. Tilly has shown that, in the German case, industrial credits represented only 20 per cent of industry's needs since most client companies preferred selffinancing.8 Teichova has also argued that relationships between German heavy industry and banking fails to confirm the traditional view.9 The Austrian and Italian cases have been analysed by Stiefel, Eigner, Vasta and Baccini in surveys of interlocking directorships tying banking and industry with the conclusion that the power relationship could be more appropriately described as 'reciprocity, of mutual support and assistance, a community of interests'.10 For Cameron, universal banks were far from 'missionary' in their industrial dealings, being rather profit maximisers and risk minimisers while not offering their support blindly.11 In the same vein, Rudolph has explained that universal banks were not 'venturesome substitutes for entrepreneurship' as their managements preferred to finance only the most profitable companies with favourable prospects which had overcome the difficulties and risks of their start-up phases.12 Tilly adheres to the same opinion, calling finance capital 'development assistance for the strong'.13 Most of these characteristics also applied to universal banking's investment abroad. It should be remembered that Viennese and Berlin banks acquired foreign industrial shares only after their traditional sources of profits -government bonds and railway securities -were no longer available. More often than not, the banks' managements were disinterested in retaining industrial shares acquired in exchange for credits and so frequently traded them on the Viennese and Berlin markets. When markets were depressed, it has become clear that such banks did not extend industrial credits out of a 'deliberate strategy of business diversification' but due to their clients' illiquidity and the desire to avoid a crash in which all chances to recover industrial debts would be lost.14 It was only in very few cases that a bank's management looked to retain its foreign industrial client's shares indefinitely, thus transforming credit provided into FDI.
The 1930s financial crisis represented a major turning point in the evolution of the universal banking system. Transforming short-term credits into industrial shares rendered these banks vulnerable to the changing fortunes of capital markets. A prolonged crisis could have devastating effects upon their liquidity.15 The crisis's impact upon universal banks' domestic, and sometimes multinational, affairs has attracted substantial attention from scholars. On the one hand, both Toniolo and Weber have argued that, even without the war and the 1930s financial crisis, universal banks would have 'collapsed under their own weight'. In their views, the involvement of deposit-taking banks in industrial promotion was inherently pro- Confalonieri provides details about the dynamics of BCI's credits to local industry (mainly electricity, steel, engineering/shipbuilding and textile companies), and shows an increase in volume during the period 1924-30. 22 Before 1914, BCI engaged in trade finance for a number of Italian firms operating in the Balkans in spite of obvious opposition from Austrians and Germans whose interests in this region were, in this way, rivalled by Italians. Much to German and Austrian banks' annoyance, BCI also promoted close relationships with the French financial world.23 Moreover, there was a great deal of aversion between the Milanese bank and the Italian authorities in Rome -Banca d'Italia and the Treasury. First of all, BCI traditionally collaborated with its international partners rather than Rome-based institutions.24 During the 1907 Italian banking crisis, BCI even opposed Banca d'Italia's measures, refused to participate in its syndicates to rescue other banks and sabotaged the attempt to save the third largest commercial bankSocietà Bancaria Italiana.25 Second, Banca d'Italia's governor, a former civil servant, was more sensitive to the Italian state's political and administrative needs than those of the financial community. Third, BCI and the Italian government held divergent views over foreign policy. Forsyth has shown how BCI's management was reluctant italian multinational banking to participate in those overseas investments that, although reinforcing Italy's colonial and imperial policy, promised indifferent or uncertain economic returns. 26 After the war, the bank successfully defended its independence against the takeover attempts of some Italian industrialists who wanted to get hold of its reserves. BCI rejected the assaults of the Perrone brothers which were supported by Ansaldo, the large industrial concern.27 Toeplitz maintained the tradition of his predecessors, preserving BCI's independence vis-à-vis single interests. This strategy substantially influenced BCI's multinational investment.
If the years 1922-25 had been favourable for BCI's business, the stock market fall during 1925 signalled the beginning of a difficult time. BCI decided to 'sail against the tide' and continued to buy securities in order to protect its portfolio's value. This policy included a substantial purchase of its own shares in order to sustain their price and so signal to the markets its soundness.28 As a result, BCI gradually turned into an industrial holding, and became preoccupied with the survival of its industrial empire rather than profit-maximising banking business. Banca d'Italia tried to provide financial assistance, but this was insufficient and BCI asked for foreign shortterm deposits (then a typical syndrome for continental banks). Therefore, the 1930s crisis caught BCI with its assets tied up in industrial credit and a net foreign indebtedness (especially when American short-term funds were withdrawn from Europe). However, Toeplitz did not wish to surrender his institution's independence in exchange for government financial assistance. BCI's banking group comprised subsidiaries, affiliates, associates and representatives.33 Subsidiaries were banks wholly owned and controlled by BCI. Affiliates arose from BCI holding a majority of their shares, stakes which allowed continuous and direct control. With regard to associated banks, BCI either held a majority of their capital and shared control with a minority shareholder or, without a significant ownership, could control, along general lines, the respective institution's policy. Finally, representatives had no autonomy and were established to provide BCI with information about a potential market. Castiglioni was a Trieste-born financier of Jewish origin who, before 1914, had gone to Vienna where he became a leading figure in international finance. Prior to 1917, he was counsellor for the Anglo-Austrian Bank, one of the most important Viennese universal banks which had extensive shareholdings in east central European banking and industry. Thereafter, Castiglioni became President of Allgemeine Depositenbank and turned this second-rank Viennese institution into a first-rank bank. Segato has shown that Castiglioni possessed effective negotiating skills. While at the 'Anglobank', he had been involved in discussions for issuing Balkan and Turkish government loans on the London and Paris markets. His reputation as an outstanding negotiator was enhanced in 1921, when he represented Italy at the diplomatic disputes between Hungary and Austria over their borders.37 Furthermore, Castiglioni was able to exploit information collected in Vienna on business opportunities in the region. He acquired industrial interests in Hungarian rubber and German and Austrian automobile companies.38
After 1918 Castiglioni expanded his financial and economic 'empire' and renewed contacts with both the president of the Hungarian Agrar Bank and the managing director of Depositenbank. Both banks were subsequently conducted as BCI's affiliates in the region. Based upon knowledge and experience acquired in Vienna, Castiglioni outlined a strategy to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for Italian economic expansion in Austria.39 Therefore, Castiglioni had much to offer to BCI. Familiar with the economic and financial environment in the former Dual Monarchy, he had already established his own industrial empire and was now interested in promoting Italian interests abroad. BCI was the bank that could offer financial assistance to 35 Toniolo, One Hundred Years, p. 51. 36 Malagoldi has described the role played by the Toeplitz brothers within the bank as follows: 'troppo grande era la sua autorita, troppo incontrollate il suo potere e il suo modo di agire. Troppo determinante la sua influenza, anche a crisi iniziata … Troppo forto il suo carattere … un'intelligenza, uno 'charme', un'esperienza, un'onesta personale, una estraneita all'intrigo politico, una capacita di lavoro del tutto fuori del comune. Se la Comit [BCI] era allora una banca che irradiava la sua attivita in tutto il bacino Mediterraneo, in tutta Europa, e potuta racconciare ed estendere tale tela, una larga parte di merito va a G. 
However, the choice of a market-entry strategy was not easy for Toeplitz as BCI was at a disadvantage compared to its foreign rivals in at least two respects. First, its management could not expect much support from the Italian government. This was due partly to the bank having always undertaken an independent policy vis-à-vis the authorities in Rome and partly because there was no agreement amongst Italian government bodies over what foreign economic policy to adopt. The Treasury warned that Italy had insufficient financial means to pursue foreign economic expansion, while the Ministry of Industry and Trade was ready to sustain the interests of local industrialists who wanted to operate overseas.42 Nevertheless, existing legislation did not prohibit Italian FDI. A 1919 decree, by which firms required Treasury permission to export capital, was not a real constraint. Second, unlike French and British banks, BCI had no previous holdings in the area upon which to build. Moreover, the largest banking institutions of the Dual Monarchy were already the subject of competition between BCI's foreign rivals.
In shares of Agrarbank, Budapest, whose president, A. Eber, subsequently became BUI's president for almost 20 years.
Compared with the investment in Foresta, BCI's FDI in east central European banking affiliates was insignificant (barely $1 m.).56 However, as they were established to provide financial assistance to BCI's industrial ventures in the region, these affiliates benefited from considerable credits from the BCI group. They were usually converted into shareholdings and fulfilled the role of a 'once-and-for-all' investment. Table 2 presents, in comparative perspective, BCI's investment and credits to east central European industry and banks. Data account for only a portion of BCI's investment in the region (according to Matiolli), being drawn from the files consulted in the archives.
In conclusion, within two years, collaboration between Toeplitz and Castiglioni facilitated BCI's entry into a completely new market where the existing presence of French and British institutions was such that BCI alone would have not stood many chances. The association between the BCI banker and the Trieste financier also compensated for the relatively passive attitude of the Italian government vis-à-vis BCI's expansion business abroad over the immediate post-1918 period. Unlike Foresta, a major investment for BCI, the banking affiliates in east central Europe did not require a substantial financial effort from the bank, although credits allocated seemed to be at least five times larger than the initial investment.
IV
After a rapid expansion within Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania to 1921, BCI's management began to experience problems in both industrial and banking activities. italian multinational banking Two main aspects need to be mentioned for they affected BCI's affairs within the region for the rest of the decade. First of all, collaboration between Toeplitz and Castiglioni came to a sudden end in 1924. Castiglioni was accused of involving Depositenbank in an unsuccessful speculative bear attack against the French franc. The Viennese bank incurred a substantial loss and collapsed, while Castiglioni was sent to jail but, given his connections (Toeplitz included), he managed to leave Austria.57 Second, for most of the interwar years, BCI undertook its overseas activities without major interference from the Italian government. In 1922, the fascist government came to power with the intention of launching an attack on BCI's leadership, but refrained due to a fear of negative reactions amongst domestic and foreign business groups.58 Consequently, Toeplitz remained the unchallenged leader of BCI until 1933. After nationalisation, BCI complied with the fascist government's political goals.
Foresta was BCI's major industrial investment in east central Europe but generated sizeable losses and almost failed. Initially, the company offered promising perspectives as it exported timber to most of Europe, Turkey and North Africa and, during the First World War, had commenced furniture production. Its market position was consolidated during its first years of existence under BCI through horizontal and vertical integration, and the acquisition of a timber monopoly in Europe.59 By 1921, Foresta had more than 38 branches and exported on a large scale to Italy. It is therefore very surprising that such a business did not produce the expected rewards. In fact, Foresta's profitability was undermined by several factors, both internal and external. First of all, although Toeplitz and Castiglioni occupied leading positions in its hierarchy, they had to delegate operative management to its former owners. It was clear from the first stages of their negotiations that the Austro-Hungarians did not want to lose business control.60 Therefore, Foresta retained a predominantly Austro-Hungarian character. This did not help its business as the postwar economic and political environment in east central Europe differed from pre-1914 conditions so that the former managers had few comparative advantages.61 Second, Foresta's organisational structure was not well suited for a 38-plant enterprise, split across five countries. Although its headquarters were in Milan, operative decisions were taken in Vienna (apart from those over strategic issues). 62 The spatial distances between factories, spread across so many countries, and the administrative office in Vienna, and between the latter and the Milanese headquarters, must have hindered the communication process and information exchange, so essential in running a multi-plant business. Finally, these deficiencies were amplified by several external factors, such as poor transport conditions and a lack of railway equipment in the region.63
Aware of these inefficiencies, the managers proceeded to partially restructure Foresta. In 1921, they set up branches in each host country to centralise business at a national level. The Viennese office retained its central role in decision-making and was directly connected with the newly-created branches.64 Thereafter, it soon became clear that most eastern European plants were unprofitable and Toeplitz appointed Rossi, BCI's expert on east central European affairs and counsellor to Foresta, to investigate the exact situation. He travelled extensively and produced lengthy reports regarding the main problems.65 Taking the Romanian case as an example (where most production units were located), Rossi noted that local enterprises did not employ a unitary accounting system and, frequently, their accounting methods were inadequate. In addition, these enterprises were run by unprofessional managers, open to bribery and unaware of basic business principles. By 1922, the Romanian branch, which centralised the accounts of all local timber enterprises, was heavily indebted to BCIR.66 Rossi suggested that, in order to identify loss-makers, each enterprise should open its own account with BCIR. He also mentioned the negative effects of the local depreciating currencies, and of increasing Russian competition on the European timber market.
Another restructuring process took place in which loss-making enterprises (mostly Czechoslovakian and Hungarian), were liquidated.67 As a result, Foresta's activities became largely concentrated on the Romanian market. It acquired a main italian multinational banking rival, Goetz SA, a well-managed and prosperous local timber business, and so became the country's largest timber company.68 However, these structural changes failed to improve the deficit with BCI and, from 1920, Foresta was unable to distribute dividends. Four years later, its debts were twice the amount of its equity.69 It may be inferred that the Viennese managers, even if familiar with the industry, were unable to run Foresta in the new circumstances. Toeplitz made a last attempt to restructure the business when he met the German-Jewish Rosenberg brothers, known for their experience in timber industry and trade.70 They took over Foresta's management in 1924 but could not resolve its problems.71 Its administrative office was moved from Vienna to Bucharest and, later, to Galati, the Romanian Black Sea port, from where timber was shipped to various markets. The Rosenbergs liquidated all non-Romanian enterprises while acquiring wagons to address the transport problem. In 1926, at last, exports revived and Foresta recommenced paying dividends. 72 However, this recovery was only temporary. Based on Rossi's reports, Toeplitz realised that Foresta required further financial support but BCI could no longer afford credits, given the change in Italian economic conditions from 1925. Toeplitz sought to attract other investors to acquire shares in the company through Foresta being turned into a Swiss holding company -Foresta Romena Holding AG, Zurich How did BCI's investments in the region's banking fare? In Romania, BCIR was the fourth largest bank in terms of total assets and financed crop products (cereals and sugar), while acquiring some local credit institutions. Through BCIR, BCI bought shares and offered credits to the Romanian economy's important sectors: timber, metallurgy, oil, banking, electricity and transport.74 In this case, too, some companies turned into major debtors -the largest, the majority-owned railway component supplier, Phoenix SA, Oradea, was due to it not being paid punctually by the Romanian government for deliveries. The government discriminated against Phoebus, given its 'foreign' ownership and BCIR divested in 1937.75 The second largest was a sugar company, Lujani SA, to which BCIR had granted important credits, guaranteed by shares.76 Lujani SA, whose main shareholder was the Viennese Credit-Anstalt, was badly affected by the 1931 financial crisis. When the Viennese bank collapsed, BCIR received 36 per cent of Lujani's shares in exchange for its illiquid credits, but was disinterested in controlling the business and tried to sell it to a group of Romanian and Dutch entrepreneurs who wanted to gain control. However, they lacked financial resources and only acquired a time option on the shares.77
These cases illustrate that BCIR gradually avoided any substantial industrial commitment. Under its Italian management, BCIR pursued a high-liquidity policy, based on short-term credits in an attempt to minimise risks. Its industrial portfolio peaked in 1922 and declined dramatically in 1937, following the sale of Phoebus shares to a local company.78 BCIR's reserves were sufficient to cover its industrial debtors' losses while it distributed dividends of 15 per cent until 1929, and of five to seven per cent from 1935 to 1941. Between 1930 and 1934 BCIR was affected by the financial crisis and, consequently, made no dividend payments.
In Hungary, BUI became the sixth largest bank in terms of assets and seventh in terms of deposits. Most of its credits went to agriculture (58 per cent), the state (25 per cent) and public enterprises (17 per cent).79 BUI had few industrial participations; apart from Magyar Foresta, it owned Società di Navigazione Interna, Budapest, the only Danubian transport company that escaped British ownership. The bank did not distribute high dividends due to the Hungarians not allowing dividend repatriation until 1939.80 Instead, BUI reinvested its profits in shares held within its portfolio and which were deposited with the Hungarian National Bank. From 1940, it financed bilateral trade that increased due to the political affinities between Hungary and fascist Italy.
However, there was an exception to thriving BCI's banking activities in the region. At a time when most of its east central European industrial investments were being gradually liquidated, Toeplitz offered large credits to Poland. As a native, Toeplitz was determined to support the largest Polish private bank which, in the Not surprisingly, Polish industrialists and bankers could not reimburse such credits and BCI ended up with large shareholdings in exchange. Given its unwillingness to engage in industrial development, from 1930 BCI's management began negotiations with the Polish government to recover its credits. However, the government distinguished between BCI's banking and industrial credits and recognised only those which were less extensive.84 A compromise was finally reached in 1938, with non-reimbursed industrial credits being compensated by a free supply of coal from Poland to Italy.85 On the whole, Toeplitz's initiative to provide financial assistance to the largest Polish private bank and other local companies proved very costly. BCI's Polish involvement ended in 1934 when Toeplitz was no longer on top of the hierarchy. This shows once more that BCI's unprofitable Polish financial commitment was entirely a result of Toeplitz's private interests and, therefore, was liquidated immediately after his departure from the bank.
V
As a universal bank, BCI's business experienced both the expansion and the contraction that the 1920s offered. In a typical manner, up to 1925 its management took advantage of the real economy's rapid expansion and bought industrial shareholdings on the stock exchange. However, soon afterwards, the stock-market boom ended and the bank was caught with a large, risky, illiquid and diversified portfolio. Despite its leader's initial resistance, BCI was finally rescued by government intervention although having to surrender its universal banking functions. These events inevitably affected BCI's multinational investment as it could no longer provide further credits abroad. In this context, this article has illustrated that such constraints would not have necessarily brought about the failure of the bank's main investments in east central Europe had its senior management acted more carefully.
The article has also shown that the expansion of BCI in the region was largely a result of Toeplitz's initiative and determination. Notwithstanding valid economic reasons, such as the considerable trading potential and the postwar business opportunities in inflation-driven east central European economies, he had also based its decisions upon non-economic motives, such as his aim to provide Poland with financial assistance during the second half of the 1920s. The timing of BCI's multinational investment in the region was highly auspicious. In less than two years, Toeplitz and Castiglioni had reserved for BCI one of Europe's largest timber companies and three banking affiliates. The only exception was BCI's unfortunate investment in Handlobank that came as a response to Toeplitz's personal aspirations.
Of BCI's overall activities, two investments were particularly remarkable in size: Foresta and Handlobank, accounting for more than a quarter of BCI's total investment in the region. However, both proved troublesome and not only because of the depressed economic conditions during the late 1920s. The case of Foresta demonstrates that BCI was unsuccessful in developing an industrial policy in the region. Toeplitz and Castiglioni were financiers par excellence but had limited knowledge of managing a multi-plant company. They spotted a potentially profitable business opportunity yet were obliged to retain its former management who failed to recognise that, after the war, a radical organisational change was required. The 'outsiders' hired by Toeplitz in 1924 could do nothing but improve the situation temporarily and the business never returned to its pre-1918 level despite several restructurings. Economic conditions after 1925 failed to permit BCI's management to allocate further credits to a declining business, but this was only a secondary explanation for Foresta's failure. Responsibility rested upon the inappropriate management of the company's assets. In conclusion, while the initiative to invest in Foresta was reasonable, its subsequent management was less inspired, unable to overcome the period's economic misfortunes. Toeplitz took the decision to divest, the shares were transformed into portfolio investment and liquidated gradually.
Foresta was not the only example of industrial managerial failure. The Bulgarian tobacco company, Orientabako, was another similar case. BCI and BCIB subscribed for a third of its capital and appointed representatives to its board.86 Similar aspects italian multinational banking undermined this business too and, from 1930, Orientabako worked at a loss. After unsuccessful steps to rescue the business, BCI sold it to a German group of tobacco manufacturers, taking advantage of certain compensation agreements negotiated between the Bulgarian and German authorities. 87 BCI's problems with the Handlobank were also not only connected with the 1930s financial crisis per se. They could have been avoided had Toeplitz not decided to invest in Poland at an inappropriate time. The placement became a considerable loss for the Italian bank and was brought to an end as soon as Toeplitz resigned. Thereafter, BCI's management had to undertake lengthy negotiations over its debt with the Polish government. This reveals that appropriate managerial capabilities on the foreign markets were central to the survival of BCI's business in the region, clearly demonstrated in particular by its banking investment. Its affiliates, established to assist Foresta, were run by its own experts. Appointed for long periods of time, Allievi, Marchesano, Rossi, Eber and L. Toeplitz were BCI's main representatives who ran BCIR, BCIB and BUI and preserved continuity of operative management.88 Although they too experienced problems, they were able to adjust and survive since loss-making industrial shareholdings were liquidated in a timely manner to focus the affiliates' businesses upon bilateral trade finance. They adopted a cautious lending policy and the banks survived until post-1945 nationalisation,89 distributing high dividends through most of the interwar period. 90 This article has tried to add another dimension to the arguments put forward by Jonker and van Zanden regarding the 'soundness' of universal banking industrial investment in interwar Europe. The case of BCI in east central Europe confirms their non-critical view up to a certain point. This region, indeed, displayed potential economic gains and the initial multinational investment was well justified. However, in order to obtain profits, BCI's management would have had to display more prudence in allocating resources and better skills in developing industrial assets abroad. The absence of such elements might have exacerbated the negative effects of the 1930s crisis upon BCI's multinational activities. Its losses could have been kept at a minimum under a less authoritarian leadership with a better management of industrial interests. Where such conditions existed, as was the case with their banking affiliates, investment survived the financial crisis and/or government interference. These observations show that, at least in BCI's case, the 1930s crisis can be blamed for the deterioration of the business climate but not for the extent of losses for which the bank's management was largely responsible. Such findings are consistent with the results on multinational banking FDI in general.91 Studies of interwar British and French banking FDI have also shown that their industrial activities in east central Europe did not survive when management was unfamiliar and unable to handle the particularities of the region and the unfavourable interwar economic conditions.
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